by Christopher C. Duncan
Fourth Year History Specialist, University of Toronto
A current topic in the news that has implications for intelligence is the dispute over Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Although this issue is not without precedent, and in fact was a topic of contention between Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan in 1985, (Fraser, 2006) the issue has resurfaced with a distinctively different and broader scope. That is, with the advent of climate change and the consequent prognosis of the melting of the Arctic sea ice, new possibilities for exploitation of the region have been created. Specifically, natural resources such as fisheries, mineral deposits, and oil and gas reserves, as well as the ability to use the Northwest Passage for commercial shipping have all proved appealing to countries vying for a share of the Arctic’s wealth, including the U.S., Russia, and Denmark (Fraser, 2006 & Crawford, 2008). However, Canada’s claims will be disputed as a consequence (Crawford, 2008). In this context, ensuring Canada’s Arctic sovereignty has become a more prominent priority of the Canadian government. These economic motivations are supplemented in the eyes of the Canadian government by reciprocal desires to maintain the integrity of Canada’s security from incursions, fears of environmental degradation (2008) and the centrality of the North to Canada’s identity (Fraser, 2006). To that end, the Canadian government has taken steps toward promoting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, including the ratification of the 1994 United Nations Covenant on the Law of the Sea and mapping of the sea floor (Crawford, 2008). Despite this, as Graham Fraser, a Toronto Star columnist, states: “Canada’s control over the region is tentative at best.” (Fraser, 2006) Canada’s future success or failure in defending its Arctic sovereignty depends on the abilities of its intelligence services to meet the challenge.
The implications for Canadian intelligence with respect to the issue of Canadian Arctic sovereignty can be understood partly in relation to previous trends that have characterized Canadian intelligence from its inception prior to confederation through World War One: that is, a continued perception of a threat to border security (whether imagined or real). Hence, the issue of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty can be seen as a logical extension of this focus for Canadian intelligence (Hamm & King, 2009) The arctic had in fact been a focus of Canadian SIGINT during the Cold War because of its ideal location for signal interception from the Soviet Union (Wark, 2009, March 23). To that end, the issue of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is clearly not without precedent in the history of Canada’s intelligence services.
At the same time, the challenge to Canadian intelligence of meeting threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty differs from the past in that it represents a realignment of traditional loyalties and interests. Specifically, the U.S. has traditionally been one of Canada’s key allies, but has openly contested Canada’s claims to Arctic sovereignty. As such, it is clear that in this respect Canadian intelligence should distance itself from its reliance on intelligence from its allies, which it has depended on to a large extent up to now (2009, March 23). In other words, a significant contributor to the success of Canadian intelligence in this matter will be the degree to which it adapts to the situation.
It must ensure the adequacy of its intelligence collection methods, which is historically a necessity of accurate analysis of intelligence and prediction of opponents’ intensions and future actions (Wark, 2008, September 15). Intelligence collection can take a variety of forms, although trends in intelligence have been towards increasing use of technology for intelligence gathering purposes. However, the important point is that a variety of thoroughly gathered intelligence is used for basing predictions. In the past, deficiencies in intelligence collection, and consequently predictions of intentions, have directly led to intelligence failure. This was the case in Pearl Harbor, although this example is much more drastic than the possible outcomes of the dispute of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.
The other key aspect of the function of intelligence to consider is its application to policy making. Regardless of the quality of the intelligence, it is useless if it is disregarded in favour of a political agenda in policy making. This can be seen in many intelligence failures in the last century, including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (2008, September 15). It is imperative for the Canadian government to make sufficient use of intelligence assessments on threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Obviously, these threats are extremely unlikely to be overt aggressive action, but predictions on the projected actions of the countries contesting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty will nevertheless be useful in pre-empting any action that could present Canada with a fait accompli (2008, September 15). In this respect, some of the changes made to Canada’s security establishment following the 9/11 attacks will be advantageous. In particular, the creation of the post of National Security Advisor will help to ensure integration of intelligence on threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty into policy making by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet (Wark, 2009, March 30). Of course, the Canadian identification with the U.S. that was also attendant to these post-9/11 institutional changes is problematic for issues of Arctic sovereignty, as mentioned previously, and will have to be addressed as such (2009, March 30).
It is evident that intelligence is directly linked to Canada’s ability to respond to threats to its Arctic sovereignty. Although Canadian intelligence does have a history of addressing border security, it is clear that to be successful,
- it must alter and refine its methods of intelligence collection (including less reliance on intelligence from traditional allies),
- and to that end, ensure that the analysis of intelligence and the predictions made are properly integrated into policy making by the government.
Bibliography
- Graham Fraser, Arctic defence, The Star, August 19, 2006, Canada section, Toronto edition.
- Alec Crawford, The security dimensions of environmental policy, The Star, July 8, 2008, Opinion section, Toronto edition.
- Hamm, Jeff & King, Brandon. (2009, March 16). Canadian Intelligence, from Origins to Gouzenko. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
- Wark, Wesley. (2009, March 23) . The Canadian Intelligence System, The Cold War and its Legacy. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
- Wark, Wesley (2008, September 15). Intelligence in the News: Reflections on intelligence controversies since September 11, 2001. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
- Wark, Wesley (2009, March 30). Canadian Intelligence Today, 30 March 2009. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
A highly innovative work – a powerful piece of writing!
Very thought provoking article!