In my mind, partisanship in the upper house is secondary to questions of appointment and composition. Granted, the current Senate may be somewhat hindered by party solidarity. But what practical purpose does the house serve in the legislative process, beyond a sobered second opinion and a rubber stamp? A system of institutional patronage may seem acceptable in a house which has but a diluted role in law-making. Yet if Canadians were to redesign the body to give it more effect, I think a reconsideration of the aforementioned would be warranted.

In my view, Senate reform presents an opportunity to remediate the biggest issue in Canadian governance – the electoral formula. The present system in the Commons tends to exaggerate Canada’s regional differences. Ontario, a province with over a third of the population, is underrepresented, creating debates over the fairness of government policies such as EI (see http://www.fairness.ca.) In turn, other provinces project their interests on the federal agenda disproportionally.

Instituting an alternate formula is a difficult question. After all, in my shamelessly Liberal opinion, some parties are unfit to rule, and it is necessary to avoid the chaos affected by party coalitions. But some sort of change is required.

So my proposition, which I feel in some ways precedes the one advanced in this article, is to entirely reform the appointment and composition of the Senate, coupled with a reconstitution of the federal electoral formula. If the Senate were representative of provincial interests through a direct vote, with a fixed number of senators per province, Canadian governance would balance the interests of provinces in the Senate with citizens in the Commons.

Such a system would be more a reflection of republicanism to the South – the intricacy of party politics, the rise of interest groups and PACs, and of course lobbyists. Perhaps it wouldn’t be a very “Canadian” arrangement – but at least it would make for better reading.