Research Analyst, The Public Policy Research Initiative

On December 3rd, 1997, Canada became the first nation to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Treaty. Analyzing the efforts required in gaining the signatures of more than 150 nations to the Ottawa Treaty and the global impact it has had over the past decade is an insightful historical exercise, as well as a reflection on Canada’s international leadership potential. Fundamentally, the Ottawa Treaty demonstrated three important aspects of global relations to the world: that international norms can be changed in a relatively short period of time, that Canada can succeed in exercising its global influence, and that the signature of the United States is not necessary to effect global change through diplomacy (Cottrell, 2009).

Prior to 1997, the usage of land mines was militarily acceptable as a defensive strategy, in order to lessen the actual hand-to-hand combat (Cottrell, 2009). Shifting the norm from the belief in the military necessity of landmines, to proving that landmines are the cause of an international humanitarian crisis was no easy task. Nevertheless, this process was significantly aided by the International Committee of the Red Cross’ 1996 report “Anti-personnel Landmines – Friend or Foe?”, which quoted leading military professionals in concluding that anti-personnel landmines have “little or no effect on the outcome of hostilities”. Nongovernmental organizations played an influential role in bringing attention to and advocating on behalf of the urgent need to ban anti-personnel land mines. A collection of six NGOs formed the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1992, which not only advocates the eradication of landmines, but also produces a yearly report assessing the progress of the world’s nations in becoming landmine-free.  Their 2009 report claims that the global stigmatization of landmines has been one of the most significant achievements of the Ottawa Treaty (International Campaign to Ban Landmines).

When the world’s nations met in October 1996, there were divisions between those who believed that an outright ban on anti-personnel landmines was the only effective solution, and those who were content with the status quo by regulating their usage (Cottrell, 2009). Convinced of the urgency of the matter, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy proclaimed Canada’s commitment to create a treaty that would implement a complete ban on anti-personnel landmines, despite critics arguing that pushing for a total ban too quickly could weaken consensus (Cottrell). Banning anti-personnel landmines was a challenge that the world ultimately accepted, and its success has been called the “Ottawa Process” by some academics. This process involved circumventing traditional arms control efforts such as UN forums or review processes, and allowing Canada to lead the push in the formation of a new global norm using the “fast-track” approach of multilateral conferences (Cottrell).

Most significantly, the Ottawa Treaty proves that Canada does not have to wait until the major superpowers of the world lead an initiative; in fact, Canada is capable of causing great positive change without American approval. More than a decade later, the Ottawa Treaty is continuing to make notable positive impacts without the signatures of the United States, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan or Russia. With the support of NGO’s monitoring the world’s progress, the Ottawa Treaty has something that the Kyoto Protocol can only wish for: relative compliance. The Landmine Monitor Report of 2009 states that 86 signatory nations to the Ottawa Treaty have completed the destruction of their anti-personnel landmine stockpiles and that the relative compliance of most nations is impressive. Despite the incredible progress that has been made, much more remains to be achieved in order for a landmine-free world.

On a related note, even though the global landmine crisis has drifted out of the national media’s focus, the fact remains that landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (or IEDs) are responsible for more than half of the deaths of the 138 Canadian Forces personnel lost in Afghanistan. While acknowledging that this is a military operation and the Ottawa Treaty only refers to anti-personnel landmines that harm civilians, such a statistic with regard to Canada’s current controversial role in Afghanistan draws Canadians’ attention to the global land mine issue. Canadians must not forget that while landmines may not be exploding in their backyards, landmines are taking the lives of Canadians and thousands of others around the world.

Canada’s leadership is needed more than ever in order to continue challenging the world to reach new goals for demining the planet. To continue to build global cooperation, Canada needs to keep funding these demining activities and research. Canada is seen as a world leader in this respect, donating C$45.9 million in 2008 to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines to conduct research, demining activities and providing recommendations. However, this is a seven percent decrease in funding from the previous year (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2009). Thus, Canada’s leadership role in this area needs to be reasserted and continued. An excellent example of how this can be done is through student leadership challenges. Mines Action Canada’s 2005 nation-wide competition to create feasible demining technologies was won by three University of Toronto Faculty of Engineering students. This type of initiative combines research with promoting awareness and needs to be supported at university campuses across the country. As well, after signing the Ottawa Treaty, Canada followed through by acting on its commitment with the creation of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies in Alberta, where engineers are employed to develop landmine neutralization equipment for humanitarian demining (Dudley, 2005). The more people think, discuss and share ideas concerning this global issue, the closer research and development comes to innovative breakthroughs.

Canada should continue to support and expand demining operations because it is a positive, international leadership role for the nation, as well as a vital humanitarian cause. More courage is needed of today’s politicians to be unafraid to issue global challenges for multilateral agreements that could have an immense impact on the world. The Ottawa Treaty exemplifies how Canada has taken an international leadership position in order to bring about global change. While land mines and IEDs remain a pressing global issue, there is much hope for international cooperation that can demonstrate how diplomatic multilateral agreements can succeed.

References

1. Cottrell, M. Patrick. (2009). Legitimacy and Institutional Replacement: The Convention on Certain ConventionalWeapons and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Treaty. International Organization, 63 (2), 217-248.

2. Dudley, Peter. (2005, October 29). Living with Landmines. The Pioneer. Retrieved November 19, 2009, from http://www.canadianfilm.com/research/living_landmines.htm

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. (2009). Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Towards a Mind-Free World. New York: Human Rights Watch.

4. International Committee of the Red Cross. (1997). Anti-personnel Landmines – Friend or Foe? A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel mines. Geneva: ICRC.

5. Mines Action Canada. (2005, March 17). Students from University of Toronto win $5000 in Canada-wide competition dedicated to alleviating suffering caused by landmines. Press Release. Ottawa: Mines Action Canada. Retrieved November 19, 2009, from http://www.minesactioncanada.org/index.cfm?fuse=learn.news-details&id=128

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Fourth Year History Specialist, University of Toronto

A current topic in the news that has implications for intelligence is the dispute over Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Although this issue is not without precedent, and in fact was a topic of contention between Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan in 1985, (Fraser, 2006) the issue has resurfaced with a distinctively different and broader scope. That is, with the advent of climate change and the consequent prognosis of the melting of the Arctic sea ice, new possibilities for exploitation of the region have been created. Specifically, natural resources such as fisheries, mineral deposits, and oil and gas reserves, as well as the ability to use the Northwest Passage for commercial shipping have all proved appealing to countries vying for a share of the Arctic’s wealth, including the U.S., Russia, and Denmark (Fraser, 2006 & Crawford, 2008). However, Canada’s claims will be disputed as a consequence (Crawford, 2008). In this context, ensuring Canada’s Arctic sovereignty has become a more prominent priority of the Canadian government. These economic motivations are supplemented in the eyes of the Canadian government by reciprocal desires to maintain the integrity of Canada’s security from incursions, fears of environmental degradation (2008) and the centrality of the North to Canada’s identity (Fraser, 2006). To that end, the Canadian government has taken steps toward promoting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, including the ratification of the 1994 United Nations Covenant on the Law of the Sea and mapping of the sea floor (Crawford, 2008). Despite this, as Graham Fraser, a Toronto Star columnist, states: “Canada’s control over the region is tentative at best.” (Fraser, 2006) Canada’s future success or failure in defending its Arctic sovereignty depends on the abilities of its intelligence services to meet the challenge.

The implications for Canadian intelligence with respect to the issue of Canadian Arctic sovereignty can be understood partly in relation to previous trends that have characterized Canadian intelligence from its inception prior to confederation through World War One: that is, a continued perception of a threat to border security (whether imagined or real). Hence, the issue of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty can be seen as a logical extension of this focus for Canadian intelligence (Hamm & King, 2009) The arctic had in fact been a focus of Canadian SIGINT during the Cold War because of its ideal location for signal interception from the Soviet Union (Wark, 2009, March 23). To that end, the issue of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is clearly not without precedent in the history of Canada’s intelligence services.

At the same time, the challenge to Canadian intelligence of meeting threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty differs from the past in that it represents a realignment of traditional loyalties and interests. Specifically, the U.S. has traditionally been one of Canada’s key allies, but has openly contested Canada’s claims to Arctic sovereignty. As such, it is clear that in this respect Canadian intelligence should distance itself from its reliance on intelligence from its allies, which it has depended on to a large extent up to now (2009, March 23). In other words, a significant contributor to the success of Canadian intelligence in this matter will be the degree to which it adapts to the situation.

It must ensure the adequacy of its intelligence collection methods, which is historically a necessity of accurate analysis of intelligence and prediction of opponents’ intensions and future actions (Wark, 2008, September 15). Intelligence collection can take a variety of forms, although trends in intelligence have been towards increasing use of technology for intelligence gathering purposes. However, the important point is that a variety of thoroughly gathered intelligence is used for basing predictions. In the past, deficiencies in intelligence collection, and consequently predictions of intentions, have directly led to intelligence failure. This was the case in Pearl Harbor, although this example is much more drastic than the possible outcomes of the dispute of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.

The other key aspect of the function of intelligence to consider is its application to policy making. Regardless of the quality of the intelligence, it is useless if it is disregarded in favour of a political agenda in policy making. This can be seen in many intelligence failures in the last century, including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (2008, September 15). It is imperative for the Canadian government to make sufficient use of intelligence assessments on threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Obviously, these threats are extremely unlikely to be overt aggressive action, but predictions on the projected actions of the countries contesting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty will nevertheless be useful in pre-empting any action that could present Canada with a fait accompli (2008, September 15). In this respect, some of the changes made to Canada’s security establishment following the 9/11 attacks will be advantageous. In particular, the creation of the post of National Security Advisor will help to ensure integration of intelligence on threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty into policy making by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet (Wark, 2009, March 30). Of course, the Canadian identification with the U.S. that was also attendant to these post-9/11 institutional changes is problematic for issues of Arctic sovereignty, as mentioned previously, and will have to be addressed as such (2009, March 30).

It is evident that intelligence is directly linked to Canada’s ability to respond to threats to its Arctic sovereignty. Although Canadian intelligence does have a history of addressing border security, it is clear that to be successful,

• it must alter and refine its methods of intelligence collection (including less reliance on intelligence from traditional allies),
• and to that end, ensure that the analysis of intelligence and the predictions made are properly integrated into policy making by the government.

1. Graham Fraser, Arctic defence, The Star, August 19, 2006, Canada section, Toronto edition.
2. Alec Crawford, The security dimensions of environmental policy, The Star, July 8, 2008, Opinion section, Toronto edition.
3. Hamm, Jeff & King, Brandon. (2009, March 16). Canadian Intelligence, from Origins to Gouzenko. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
4. Wark, Wesley. (2009, March 23) . The Canadian Intelligence System, The Cold War and its Legacy. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
5. Wark, Wesley (2008, September 15). Intelligence in the News: Reflections on intelligence controversies since September 11, 2001. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.
6. Wark, Wesley (2009, March 30). Canadian Intelligence Today, 30 March 2009. Unpublished lecture notes, University of Toronto.

by Salahuddin Rafiquddin

Copy Editor, The Policy Exchange &                 Director of Infrastructure, University of Toronto Model Parliament

Citizens all across Canada have undoubtedly heard of extremism in many forms over the past decade. The attacks of 11 September 2001 have pushed extremism, terrorism, and religious fundamentalism to the forefront of mainstream news media. This subject had invaded the minds of many in North America; Canadians are no exception. For policy makers in the federal government, however, the issue of extremism has largely been on the back burner.[1]

It has become common place to read the names of Omar Khadr – a Canadian currently held in Guantanamo Bay on charges of killing an american soldier and the only westerner currently held at the facility[2] - and Maher Arar – a Canadian who was arrested and deported to Syria, where he was allegedly tortured.[3] These men, and many more, are in constant rotation on the news, but policy to protect Canadians accused of terrorism has not been forthcoming. The integrity of organizations like CSIS, which exists solely to ensure the safety of Canadians, has even been called into question in recent months.[4] The Security Intelligence Review committee – a watchdog in charge of supervising CSIS – said “advice and guidance” is needed from the federal government if past errors, such as relationships with countries that have a history of disregarding human rights, are to be avoided.[5] If extremism is to be dealt with swiftly and effectively, the the integrity of the institutions concerned must be maintained, even if sweeping changes are needed. An immediate action that can ensure the fluidity of ensuring equal rights and safety for all Canadians, is addressing the issues that have plagued CSIS in the past. CSIS’s has deported citizens, on the basis of terrorism suspicion, to foreign countries to be questioned. The organization’s historic ignorance of human rights in these foreign countries – Syria for example in the case of Maher Arar, has been cannon fodder for opponents of the organization and, to this day, remains a point of controversy.[6] Canadian policy makers should work proactively in ensuring that CSIS works in a positive and productive manner in which Canadian citizens are questioned by lawful Canadian standards in a Canadian setting. With this perspective on interrogation, past blunders like the Maher Arar saga can be avoided and current issues, like Omar Khadr, can be addressed properly with little to no negative repercussions.

Though the issues of ill fated Canadians have been prominent in the media, the issue of extremism has not followed suit in chambers of government. The protection of citizens is the core mission of state and, unfortunately, Canada has not done its best in ensuring it’s accomplishment of that goal. In recent memory the issue of the “Toronto 18” can be seen as a failure on the part of policy makers. Though only four of the men initially charged with terrorism have pled guilty[7], the larger issue remains; how did so many young men, in seemingly normal lives, come to the conclusion that violent acts of terrorism were the course of action in addressing their grievances? Why they came to the conclusion they did is only one factor in a greater picture; how can the Canadian government ensure it never happens again? Canadian public policy, if aimed at ensuring that extremists cannot foster among Canadians, should proactively seek to include minorities, or groups of people who find themselves stigmatized by the larger Canadian community. The disenfranchised and socially alienated ones of society, be it people of minority religious, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds, are some of the most susceptible to radicalization.[8] The Canadian government should co-ordinate efforts through multiple levels of initiatives, at the personal, communal, and national level, to foster a sense of Canadian identity and collective unity amongst the susceptible so a large group of individuals will not be seduced by extremist ideals. The goals of policy should ensure that all Canadians, despite their connection with ethnic, regional, religious, or cultural groups, have a collective voice in condemning acts of terror and ultimately, extremist ideals.

The largest issue at hand that policy makers have disregarded is an open dialogue on extremism in Canada.[9] Richard Fadden, director of CSIS, called for a nuanced debate during a conference in Ottawa.[10] He said that Canada, in particular Canadian policy makers, need to have a dialogue on the issue due to the fact Canada is not immune from terrorism.[11] In recent months, the policies that government have addressed have been on the whole regarding domestic issues such as fiscal expenditure and political rivalries that have had the prospect of leading to untimely elections. Extremism is a concern all policy makers in Canada have an obligation in addressing. Unfortunately, it has fallen on the back burner of politicians in Ottawa and sadly, Canadians are suffering as a result; Omar Khadr is just one case in point. The dialogue government should pursue should include all political parties with the hope of creating a solid policy that can be supported in spite of which political party is in power. The issue of national security should not become a new partisan debate. Further, if any dialogue on the issue is created, community groups should have some avenue to voice their opinions, concerns, or grievances, so that when a policy can come into effect, the alienation many groups face in today’s society can be limited.

Ultimately, extremism has been an issue that has trail blazed the new millennium as a global concern. Canada should not fall behind in addressing an issue that has serious ramifications for domestic security. To date, the job done by policy makers and institutional organizations has kept the populace safe but, the room for improvement is great and should be taken advantage of. With Canada’s active role in Afghanistan and high profile involvement with individuals such as Omar Khadr, the imperative for action is present, but improvement can only occur if the issue is brought back into consideration.

[2] CBC News. (2009, June 23). CBC News – World – Omar Khadr: Coming of age in a Guantanamo Bay jail cell. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/01/13/f-omar-khadr.html

[3] CBC News. (2007, January 26). CBC News In Depth: Maher Arar. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/

[4] The Canadian Press. (2009, October 29). CBC News – Canada – Canada not immune from extremism: CSIS head. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/29/canada-terror-csis029.html

[5] The Canadian Press. (2009, October 29). CBC News – Canada – Canada not immune from extremism: CSIS head. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/29/canada-terror-csis029.html

[6] The Canadian Press. (2009, October 29). CBC News – Canada – Canada not immune from extremism: CSIS head. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/29/canada-terror-csis029.html

[7] CBC News. (2009, October 9). CBC News – Canada – ‘Toronto 18′ timeline: Key events in the case. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/02/f-toronto-timeline.html

[8] POWELL, B. (2005, October 23). TIME Europe Magazine | The Enemy Within – 1. Time Europe. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/051031/story.html

[9] The Canadian Press. (2009, October 29). CBC News – Canada – Canada not immune from extremism: CSIS head. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/29/canada-terror-csis029.html

[10] The Canadian Press. (2009, October 29). CBC News – Canada – Canada not immune from extremism: CSIS head. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/29/canada-terror-csis029.html

[11] The Canadian Press. (2009, October 29). CBC News – Canada – Canada not immune from extremism: CSIS head. CBC.ca. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/29/canada-terror-csis029.html